must not, however, be allowed to blind us to the understanding that his own life gives us of the neurotic, and untrustworthy, origin of his unbelief and the unbelief of many others.
ConclusionIn Chapter One and in this section, I note that Freud powerfully expressed the argument that the psychological needs served by religious beliefs make such beliefs no longer believable. But, as I have shown here, such a thesis is a sword that cuts both ways; indeed, I claim that it cuts, more deeply into the roots of atheism than it cuts in the other direction. The case for this claim is based on two final arguments that the reader can now evaluate. First, I have noted that at no time did Freud psychoanalyze someone who believed in God so as to show in any specific way how belief is a consequence of neurotic childhood experience. But in the preceding pages, we have seen how detailed clinical evidence does show that the rejection of God can be a consequence of unconscious neurotic needs. Furthermore, the unbeliever in question is Freud himself, and the unbelief in question includes his specific critical theories of religion. Second, the present theoretical understanding ties Freud’s atheism and, by extension, the atheism of many others44—much more firmly to the theoretical structure of psychoanalysis than Freud ever tied belief. The interpretation of Freud’s unbelief as derived from the effects of separation anxiety is not integral to Freudian psychoanalysis, but its logic is widely found in today’s expanded psychoanalytic framework. And of course, the interpretation given here of Freud’s atheism as involving derealization, repression, projection, and fixation uses standard Freudian concepts. Finally, the interpretation of atheism as unconscious Oedipal wish-fulfillment is one that comes from the very center of Freudian theory. The reader may not agree with me that the weight of the psychological evidence now makes atheism a more probable symptom of neurosis than theism. However, at the very least, it should be clear that atheism certainly may often be an expression of a psychological pathology. This conclusion, combined with the preceding rationale, also means that the whole question of God—yes, even der liebe Gott—needs a new and much fairer treatment on the part of the “compact majority” that controls contemporary psychology, a majority well known for its persistent criticism of religious belief. In the future, as psychology moves (as I believe it will) toward a more honest approach to the question of the existence of God, I propose that at least two important spirits of Freud would wish such a new venture well: the spirit of his intellectual courage, and the spirit of a three-year-old boy with his nanny. |